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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAW OF
HOSTILE MILITARY EXPEDITIONS
MANUEL R. GARCIA-MORA*
NTERNATIONAL law unmistakably postulates that a neutral State
must maintain an attitude of strict impartiality toward belligerents
in the presence of a war.' Included in this obligation is the duty of a
neutral State not only to abstain from participating in the conflict but
also to refuse the use of its territory and resources for the organization
of military expeditions against States with which it is at peace.2 A similar
obligation exists in the presence of a civil war or an insurgency in the
territory of a foreign State.3 It can thus be seen that the duty to prevent
the formation of military expeditions is not in any way limited by the
relations of neutrality. It is a duty which exists in peacetime as well.
Though the law in this regard is relatively clear, it is believed that its
somewhat narrow construction has made it susceptible of violations by
the States. A critical examination of this law may therefore bring out
its deficiencies and the urgent necessity for revision.
THE TRADITIONAL LAW
Present international consensus regards the law of hostile military ex-
peditions as specifically applying to the act of organizing in neutral
territory an expedition for the purpose of engaging in military operations
against a State with which the former is at peace.4 It seems similarly
agreed that the rules against hostile military expeditions are applicable
mutatis mutandis to naval 5 and aerial0 expeditions organized for similar
ends. Though initially developed in connection with neutrality, this
branch of the law is only a phase of the general duty of a State to prevent
* Professor of Law, University of Detroit.
1. For a full discussion of this duty of impartiality, see 7 Hackworth, Digest of Inter-
national Law 372-79 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Hackworth].
2. 3 Hyde, International Law 2254 (2d ed. 1945).
3. The application of the law of hostile military expeditions in respect to civil war
is not always well observed, and most discussions take place within the context of neutral-
belligerent relations. See Fenwick, International Law 303 (3d ed. 1948).
4. "Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the
territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents." Convention Respecting the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Second Inter-
national Peace Conference, No. V, art. IV (hereinafter cited as Hague Convention No. V).
For text, see 2 Malloy, Treaties, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between
the United States of America and Other Powers 2290 (1910) [hereinafter cited as Malloy].
S. Wiesse, Droit International Appliqu6 Aux Guerres Civiles 169 (1898).
6. See Article 46 of the Hague Air Rules of 1923. For text, see 32 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp.
38 (1938).
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the commission of injurious acts against friendly foreign countries.7 It
is therefore equally applicable to a civil strife or simply to acts threaten-
ing the peace and security of a foreign State.8 In regard to a civil strife,
however, the law has its foundation on the obligation of every State to
respect the independence of other nationsY Thus, while in the presence
of war the obligation of a neutral is one of impartiality, as applied to a
civil war the duty is one of noninterference in the conflict" irrespective
of whether a status of belligerency has been recognized." But whether
the State is confronted with a duty of impartiality or with one of non-
interference, the obligation to prevent hostile military expeditions from
departing from its jurisdiction remains essentially the same. 2 The duty
involved has been summarized as one of prevention, 3 and it proceeds
largely upon the theory that since international law confers upon every
State a power of exclusive control over its territorial domain,' 4 concur-
7. Curtis, The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions as Applied by the United States, 8
Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1908).
8. Rougier, Les Guerres Civiles et le Droit Des Gens 415, 417 (1903). He seems to
believe that this principle applies to a civil war when belligerency has been recognized.
PodestA Costa, on the other hand, believes that if the expedition is to help the legitimate
government, there is no obligation to prevent it, for this obligation only arises if the ex-
pedition is organized with the purpose of aiding the insurgents. See 2 Podesti Costa,
Derecho Internacional Pfiblico 265 (3d ed. 1955).
9. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 229 (1947).
10. This duty of noninterference was clearly laid down by Mr. Justice Story in The
Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 283, at 337 (1822), where he said: "The government
of the United States has recognized the existence of a civil war between Spain and her
colonies, and has avowed a determination to remain neutral between the parties, and to
allow to each the same rights of asylum, and hospitality and intercourse. Each party is,
therefore, deemed by us a belligerent nation, having, so far as concerns us, the sovereign
rights of war, and entitled to be respected in the exercise of those rights. We cannot
interfere, to the prejudice of either belligerent, without making ourselves a party to the
contest, and departing from the posture of neutrality." Despite these commendable words,
it has been proven that this duty of noninterference is rather deceptive, for in fact it
amounts to intervention on behalf of the one or the other in the rebellion. See Padelford,
International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife 119 (1939).
11. 2 Oppenheim, International Law 532 (6th ed. Lauterpacht 1944).
12. Rougier, however, believes that there is a difference, namely, that in case of war the
obligation is of a strictly legal nature, while noninterference in a civil strife is simply a
moral obligation which can be disregarded with impunity. See Rougier, op. cit. supra note
8, at 418 n.2. It may be answered, however, that since intervention violates the sovereignty
and independence of a State, this is in itself a legal obligation imposed by general inter-
national law. See Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 9, at 229.
13. Rougier, op. cit. supra note 8, at 423.
14. 1 Fauchille, Trait6 du Droit International Public 3-10 (8th ed. 1925). Mr. Justice
Story referred to this principle as follows: "Every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty
and jurisdiction within its own territory." Story, Conflict of Laws § 18 (8th ed. 1883).
Story, supra at § 8.
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rent with this-is the correlative duty to protect within its territory the
rights of other States.15 This is, therefore, a prescription resulting from
the exercise of territorial sovereignty' and unmistakably falling within
the competence of the territorial State. Underlying these principles is
the recognition of a community of interests existing in the world society
imperatively demanding the suppression within each country's territory
of harmful activities directed against foreign States.' 7
With this background in mind, it may be readily perceived that the
violation of the foregoing obligation engages the international respon-
sibility of the State precisely because State inactivity in preventing the
organization of a military expedition amounts to complicity in the hostile
attack and can logically be regarded as actual governmental participation
in the conflict.' 8 It would seem, therefore, that State tolerance raises a
presumption of governmental complicity which amounts to an interna-
tional delinquency.
By thus acknowledging that the principle of international law render-
ing hostile military expeditions criminal is based upon a failure of a State
to fulfill its duty towards another, there is an express recognition of
the individualistic nature of international law accordingly concerned with
defining the rights and jurisdiction of a State vis-a-vis those of other
States and with the possibility of their successful reconciliation. 9 To
pose the matter exclusively in terms of an injury to the State is to
simplify the nature of the problem, for the fact will have to be faced
that under a modern law of nations deeply concerned with social co-
operation, the duties of the State towards the international community
are also vitally at stake."0 In particular, hostile military expeditions
15. In this connection, Judge Huber, the sole arbitrator in Island of Palmas (United
States v. Netherlands) (1828) said: "Territorial sovereignty ... involves the exclusive right
to display the activities of the State. This right has as a corollary a duty: the obligation
to protect within the territory the rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity
and inviolability in peace and in war, together with the rights which each State may claim
for its nationals in foreign territory." For text of this decision, see 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb.
Awards 829 (1949); Scott, Hague Court Reports 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1932). Judge Moore,
in his dissenting opinion in the Lotus case said: "It is well settled that a State is bound
to use due diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions of criminal acts against
another nation or its people." Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 at 88 (1927).
16. U.N. Secretariat, Survey of International Law, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/1 Rev. 1, at
34-35 (1949).
17. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreigners for Treason and Offenses Against
the Safety of the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 567 (1958);
Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States, 22 Am.
J. Intl L. 105 (1928).
18. Curtis, supra note 7, at 34-37.
19. Jenks, The Scope of International Law, 31 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 1954 at 1-3 (1956).
20. Alvarez, The Reconstruction and Codification of International Law, 1 Int'l L. &
1958]
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seriously injure the legitimate expectations of the peoples of the world,
for it is a value of the international society to localize wars to minimize
the danger of their spreading to other nations and to prevent a civil
strife from becoming an actual testing ground for the forces and weapons
of potential belligerents. 21 The problem is even more acute with the
establishment of the United Nations, for in so far as a military action
against a State by the United Nations might be involved, the member
States are not only obliged to assist the United Nations in carrying out
its lawful action but also to refrain from giving any assistance to the
State against which enforcement action is undertaken.2 2
If the foregoing observations be correct, the interests of the world
society will be adequately served if the States effectively refrain from
augmenting the fighting forces of the belligerents in an international war,
or the insurgents in a civil strife,2 3 or of an aggressor against whom the
world organization takes enforcement action. The force of this sugges-
tion reveals itself with all its cogency if it is considered that international
conflagrations have their roots in local conflicts between minor States
or in civil wars apparently confined to the territory of one State.24 In
situations where the United Nations might be involved, the intervention
of the Chinese Communists in the Korean conflict in 1950 shows only
too well that but for the United Nations' self-restraint the matter might
well have developed into an international war of the greatest dimensions
threatening the existence of the world organization itself. This also in-
structively illustrates the proposition that as long as a strong centralized
authority is not yet developed, the obligation to prevent hostile expedi-
tions will have to remain as a fundamental principle of the law.
However, in dealing with this branch of the law, the interaction of law
and politics is at once perceivable, and it may not be an exaggeration
to say that the law of hostile military expeditions is a principle of inter-
national law only by virtue of national policies seeking to support wars
Comp. L.Q. 469 (1947). See also Judge Alvarez's dissenting opinion in the Advisory Opinion
of the International Court of Justice concerning the International Status of South-West
Africa, [19501 I.C.J. Rep. 174, 176. See also Hon. Viscount Jowitt, The Value of Inter-
national Law in Establishing Cooperation Among Nations, 1 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 295 (1947);
Loewenstein, Sovereignty and International Cooperation, 48 Am. J. Intq L. 222 (1954).
21. Thus, in respect to the Spanish Civil War, the Portuguese Government stated in
1936 that "the civil war in Spain is an international war." Schwarzenberger, Power Politics
-A Study in International Relations 299 (2d ed. 1951).
22. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5.
23. 7 Moore, A Digest of International Law § 1298 (1906) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
24. E.g., some writers maintain that World War II actually began in Spain in 1936.
See Palmer and Perkins, International Relations: The World Community in Transition 553
(1953). This assertion illustrates vividly the urgent necessity for the effective regulation
of hostile military expeditions.
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or revolutions where it is most politically advantageous to do so.25
Underlying the law, therefore, is the pursuit of self-interest neatly garbed
in a deliberate State policy. 6 Moreover, the impact of the outbreak of
war or civil strife is so vast and complicated that the law of hostile
military expeditions can be adequately treated only in the context of the
interplay of domestic law and politics. A phase of the broader law of
neutrality and noninterference which has proven to be peculiarly vul-
nerable to the vicissitudes of political demands,2 7 the law of hostile
military expeditions is bound to meet a similar fate. Because of national
policies, this branch of the law exhibits a high degree of instability.
These deficiencies are strengthened by the unquestionable fact that inter-
national law gives to each State discretion to enforce the duty of pre-
vention as it sees fit.
With this consideration in mind, it is interesting but not at all surpris-
ing to note that the legal practice of the States in this area is governed
by a variety of rules dependent upon a disturbing number of factors.
These will be seen in the substantive treatment of the law of the various
States and the frustrated attempts of international law at effective
regulation.
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
Municipal statutes enforcing the international duty of preventing
military expeditions are historically traceable to the Act of June 5, 1794
making it a misdemeanor for any person, within the jurisdiction of the
United States, to "prepare the means for any military expedition or
enterprise . . .against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince
or state with whom the United States are at peace ... ."' Although
this act was enacted initially as a temporary measure owing to the
difficulties experienced by the United States in maintaining a strict
neutrality in the wars of the French Revolution, it was perpetuated by
the Act of April 24, 1800.29 However, with the increased emphasis upon
neutral duties arising out of the Napoleonic wars, the prohibition of
military expeditions was incorporated in a more effective neutrality law
enacted in 1818, which, inter alia, made it a crime
if any person shall, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, begin
or set on foot, or provide or prepare the means for, any military expedition or
enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any
foreign prince or state,... with whom the United States are [at] peace .... 30
25. Strausz-Hup6 and Possony, International Relations-In the Age of Conflict Between
Democracy and Dictatorship 354-55 (2d ed. 1954).
26. Jessup, Neutrality-Today and Tomorrow 209 (1936).
27. Politis, La Neutralit6 et la Paix (1935).
28. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 381, 384.
29. Act of April 24, 1800, ch. 35, 2 Stat. 54.
30. Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 88, § 6, 3 Stat. 449.
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This provision was subsequently incorporated in the Revised Statutes
in substantially similar form."' In 1909 the provisions of the statute
were enacted in the revision and codification of the criminal law,32 and
by section 8 of the Act of June 15, 1917, a the pertinent provision of
the Criminal Code was amended by adding to the punishable acts not
only the preparation but also the furnishing of money for military or
naval expeditions, and also by providing that the penalties of fine and
imprisonment may be imposed concurrently. The present provision thus
states:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides
or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military
or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or
dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with
whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3,000 or im-
prisoned not more than three years, or both.3 4
The foregoing provision represents the standard treatment of the law
of hostile military expeditions in American law. A cursory reading of
this provision will show clearly that its injunction is not limited to
situations where in the course of a war the United States chooses to
remain neutral.35 More generally, the brief history of American legis-
lation here outlined shows remarkably well the consolidation of the law
of hostile military expeditions in the domestic legislation of a State
interested and willing to make it work. It is largely for this reason that
there is ample justification in the double assertion that American legis-
lation in this regard has been a model followed by other nations3" and
that much of international law on the subject is unmistakably traceable
to American experience.37
Turning now to the practical application of the statute, it will be
shortly seen that to determine the acts which fall within its province is
one of the most acute problems of the law. The language of the statute,
"military or naval expedition or enterprise, 38 suggests a distinction be-
tween an expedition and an enterprise and one main source of confusion
31. Rev. Stat. § 5286 (1875). See also, 7 Moore 908-09.
32. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 13, 35 Stat. 1090.
33. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 8, 40 Stat. 223.
34. Foreign Relations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1952). For the application of this provision,
see 7 Hackworth § 664. See also the recent indictment, under this provision, of a former
President of Cuba and others. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1958, § 1, p. 1, col. 1.
35. 3 Hyde, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2254 n.2.
36. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 384 n.25 (1954).
37. Curtis, supra note 7, at 2. Authors on the subject cite American cases and practice
with approval. See Wiesse, op. cit. supra note 5, at 169-74.
38. See notes 30 and 33 supra.
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is the frequent failure to distinguish between the twof 9 Though their line
of demarcation may sometimes be rather shadowy, in reality two different
offenses have been established whose exact make-up consists of entirely
different elements. It seems clear that to constitute a military expedi-
tion two basic factors need be present. First, there must be an associa-
tion or an organization of a military character within the United States.40
This condition seems most naturally to assume that unless an actual
organization is in operation, a potential injury to a foreign State can
hardly be deemed to exist. 1 Behind this condition there is the further
supposition that an individual acting alone cannot seriously threaten
the peace and security of a foreign State.4 On this plane, the departure
of single individuals or of unorganized groups for the purpose of joining
the forces of the belligerents is not a violation of the law and a duty of
prevention need not be acknowledged. 43 Thus, during the revolutionary
years, when the Mexican Government complained of military expeditions
allegedly formed in the United States with the purpose of overthrowing
the existing regime, the State Department called attention to the distinc-
tion "on the one hand, between the passage of men singly or in small
groups across our frontier and into another country, or the sailing of
individuals or small groups in the ordinary course of events from one
of our ports, and on the other hand, the departure from our territory of
organized groups of men avowing the purpose of undertaking belligerent
activities in foreign territory,144 vigorously asserting that a duty of pre-
vention only existed in the presence of the latter. This distinction is a
basic postulate of American law in this area and has been applied with
impeccable consistency. As early as 1793, Thomas Jefferson, then Secre-
39. This distinction, however, has been unequivocally endorsed by the courts. See
Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632 (1896), and, subsequently, United States v. Sander,
241 Fed. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
40. See the note of Secretary of State Marcy to Mr. Escalante, May 8, 1856. 7 Moore
927.
41. United States v. Tauscher, 233 Fed. 597, 599-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
42. However, in United States v. Ram Chandra, 254 Fed. 635, 636 (N.D. Cal. 1917),
the court said: "I see no reason, however, why a single individual may not begin or set
on foot a military expedition or enterprise, and more especially why a single individual may
not well provide or prepare the means for such an expedition or enterprise."
43. See the note of the Counselor of the State Department to the German Ambassador
in the United States, October 6, 1914, 7 Hackworth 412. See also the note of Secretary of
State Jefferson to the Minister of France, November 30, 1793, 7 Moore 917.
44. Note of Secretary of State Knox to the Mexican Chargi d'Affaires, June 7, 1911.
7 Hackworth 410. It is also well known that in 1870, during the Franco-German War,
1200 Frenchmen were allowed to depart from New York in two French vessels for the
purpose of joining the French Army. The United States Government did not interfere with
their departure on the ground that the men were not organized in a body. See 2 Oppenheim,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 565 n.4.
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tary of State, addressed a note to the Minister of France forcibly stating
that "the Government of the United States will not at the request of a
foreign government intervene to prevent the transit to the country of the
latter of persons objectionable to it unless they form part of a hostile
military expedition."45 This curious paradox of not compromising a
State's responsibility even if its territory is being used as a basis of
operations by unorganized individuals can only be understood in the
light of laissez faire conceptions, more particularly the deep conviction
that wars were matters between States and that therefore the freedom
of the individual should not suffer in his relations with belligerents.4 6 It
may be added in passing that such assumptions of the American law
were faithfully reflected in Article VI of the Hague Convention Number
V of 1907 which states: "The responsibility of a neutral Power is not
engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier separating to offer
their services to one of the belligerents."4 To appreciate the full impact
of this provision, it should be compared with Article IV of the same
Convention which says that "corps of combatants cannot be formed nor
recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist
the belligerents."4 When these two provisions are viewed together, the
neutral State must prevent its frontier from being crossed by corps or
bands which have already been organized on its territory, but may re-
main indifferent in respect to individuals acting in an isolated manner.49
Though in thus providing,, international law has shown its greatest weak-
ness as will be subsequently seen,"° for present purposes it is only neces-
sary to emphasize that the American distinction in this regard conforms
exactly to the requirements of the law of nations.
The second factor necessary for the existence of a military expedition
is the presence of a common design of hostile operation against a friendly
State.51 This condition would seem to follow logically and naturally, for
if a hostile criminal intent is lacking, no injury to the foreign State in
question can be said to have been committed. Broadly then, it may be
said that under the relevant statute and case law, if these two factors are
not present, the United States is unwilling to recognize the existence of
45. Note of Secretary of State Jefferson to the French Ambassador, November 30, 1793,
7 Moore 917.
46. Stone, op. cit. supra note 36, at 384.
47. Hague Convention No. V, art. VI, 2 Malloy 2298.
48. Hague Convention No. V, art. IV, 2 Malloy 2298.
49. 3 Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences-Meetings of the Second,
Third and Fourth Commissions 51-52 (1921).
50. This matter is discussed in pp. 325-30 infra.
51. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 653-54 (1896).
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a military expedition and, consequently, a duty of prevention does not
arise.r.
In marked contrast with a military expedition, a military enterprise
is more comprehensive in scope. The United States Supreme Court has
defined it as "a martial undertaking, involving the idea of a bold,
arduous and hazardous attempt. s5 3 Clearly, then, while a military ex-
pedition might conceivably be herein embraced, the concept of a military
enterprise gives a wider sweep to the statute and may consequently in-
clude various undertakings not only by a number of persons but by a
single individual as well.-4 Thus, generally, but not exhaustively, the
miscellaneous acts of sending spies from the United States,55 furnishing
munitions to rebels,56 participating in a scheme to start a revolution in
a possession against the mother country,5" and conspiring to blow up
tunnels between the United States and Canada5 s have all been charac-
terized by the courts as falling within the purview of a military enterprise
and, therefore, punishable under the statute.59 It is highly significant that
these activities would not have qualified as military expeditions simply
because the existence of an organization of a strictly military character
was absent.6 0 It should be manifestly clear, however, that even though
the United States would seem to go beyond the requirements of Articles
IV and VI of the Hague Convention Number V of 1907 previously cited,"'
in that it prohibits and penalizes a number of acts not embraced in
those provisions, nevertheless these acts are prohibited by general inter-
national law which imposes the duty to prevent any kind of injurious acts
directed against foreign States.6 2
In recognition of the preceding considerations, the United States has
enforced its neutrality laws, in which the prohibition of military ex-
peditions is included, in cases of insurgency in which recognition of
belligerency has not been granted. Thus, on June 12, 1895, and July 27,
1896, the President of the United States issued two proclamations noting
that Cuba was the seat of serious civil disturbances and admonishing
52. 3 Hyde, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2255.
53. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 650 (1896).
54. United States v. Sander, 241 Fed. 417, 419-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
55. Ibid.
56. Gandara v. United States, 33 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 612
(1930); United States v. Chakraberty, 244 Fed. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
57. Jacobsen v. United States, 272 Fed. 399 (7th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 256 U.S.
703 (1921).
58. United States v. Bopp, 230 Fed. 723 (NID. Cal. 1916).
59. For other cases, see 7 Hackworth 402-04.
60. United States v. Sander, 241 Fed. 417, 419-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
61. See notes 47, 48 supra.
62. Garcia-Mora, supra note 17, at 567.
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all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States to refrain, inter
alia, from forming or taking part in military expeditions in violation of
the neutrality laws. 3 American courts considered these proclamations
as sufficiently authoritative for the application of the United States neu-
trality laws. Thus, in The Three Friends64 the Supreme Court said:
We are thus judicially informed of the existence of an actual conflict of arms in
resistance of the authority of a government with which the United States are on
terms of peace and amity, although acknowledgment of the insurgents as belligerents
by the political department has not taken place; and it cannot be doubted that, this
being so, the act in question [the neutrality statute] is applicable.65
A similar proclamation was issued on March 2, 1912 in respect to the
Mexican Civil War.66 These instances strikingly illustrate the proposition
that the prohibition of hostile military expeditions is of a permanent
character not exclusively dependent upon the existence of an interna-
tional war.
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF OTHER COUNTRIES
Following American example closely, Great Britain enacted the Foreign
Enlistment Act in 181967 which remained in force until 1870. As the act
failed to prevent adequately the organization of hostile expeditions as
evidenced by the Alabama controversy,68 it was subsequently replaced
by a new Foreign Enlistment Act enacted on August 9, 1870.69 The
pertinent provision of this act is as follows:
If any person within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions, and without the license
of Her Majesty,-
Prepares or fits out any naval or military expedition to proceed against the
dominions of any friendly state, the following consequences shall ensue:
(1) Every person engaged in such preparation or fitting out, or assisting therein,
or employed in any capacity in such expedition, shall be guilty of an offence against
this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punish-
ments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and
imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.
(2) All ships, and their equipments, and all arms and munitions of war, used
in or forming part of such expedition, shall be forfeited to Her Majesty.70
63. 2 Defk and Jessup, A Collection of Neutrality Laws, Regulations and Treaties of
Various Countries 1195-96 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Deik and Jessup].
64. 166 U.S. 1 (1896).
65. Id. at 65-66.
66. 2 Deik and Jessup 1200.
67. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, 59 Geo. 3, c. 69.
68. See note 90 infra.
69. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 90.
70. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 90, § 11. This and other provisions
of the act have been substantially embodied in Article 955 of the King's Regulations and
Admiralty Instructions, 1926. For text, see 1 De~k and Jessup 150-53.
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The most authoritative early statement of the conditions under which
the statute would apply is that contained in the judgment of the House
of Lords in Regina v. Sandoval7l relating to purchases of goods and
munitions in Great Britain for the purpose of aiding an insurrection in
Venezuela. As to the elements of the offense provided for by the act,
the court said that the act of "fitting out" an expedition includes its
preparation as well. The court thus concluded that any act which "con-
tributes in any material degree towards setting on foot an expedition
fitted for warlike purposes ... is the preparation of that expedition."72
Similarly, in The Queen v. Janeson,73 involving a British subject accused
of assisting to prepare a military expedition to proceed against the South
African Republic without the license of Her Majesty, the court advanced
a step forward in holding that if there be an unlawful preparation of an
expedition by some person within Her Majesty's dominions, any British
subject who assists in such preparation will be guilty of an offense even
though he renders the assistance from a place outside Her Majesty's
dominions."
In striking similarity to the American practice, the British Government
has also applied the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 to civil strifes
without the existence of a declaration of belligerency. Thus, by a declara-
tion of January 1937, the Foreign Enlistment Act was declared to be
applicable to the Spanish Civil War.75 Though this declaration specifi-
cally referred to the provisions of the act prohibiting persons to enlist
in the service of either side to the conflict,76 it is generally accepted that
section 11 of the act which deals with hostile military expeditions is
probably the only section which is so worded as to make it unmistakably
clear that it applies to situations where a formal war has not been
recognized.7 7 This interpretation clearly indicates that the operation
of the Foreign Enlistment Act, like its American counterpart, is not at all
dependent upon the existence of war in the technical legal sense.78
The adoption by other countries of substantially similar provisions
prohibiting the formation of hostile military expeditions shows remark-
ably well the full measure of agreement existing on the subject. Thus,
the French Penal Code, though not specifically referring to military
expeditions, more generally prohibits any hostile action which exposes
71. 56 L.T.R. (ns.) 526 (1887), per J. Wills.
72. Ibid.
73. [18961 2 Q.B. 425, per Lord Russell, C. J.
74. Id. at 430.
75. 2 Oppenheim, International Law 532-33 (6th ed. Lauterpacht 1944).
76. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 90, §§ 4, 5.
77. McNair, The Law Relating to the Civil War in Spain, 53 L.Q. Rev. 471, 494-96
(1937).
78. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 235 n.4, 273 n.7 (1947).
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the State to a declaration of war.79 Pursuant to this provision, measures
of a temporary character have been enacted in the presence of particular
wars. ° In applying this legislation, the Civil Tribunal of the Seine held
in In re Florsheim1 that a contract made with a view to forming a hostile
military expedition against a foreign State is null and void and, thus,
unenforceable in court.8 2 This case compares with the early American
case, Kennett v. Chambers,83 involving a contract between citizens of
the United States and an inhabitant of Texas whereby the latter agreed
to convey land in Texas to the former in consideration of advances of
money to enable him to raise and procure men to carry on the war with
Mexico. The Supreme Court held the contract to be contrary to the
United States policy toward Mexico and, therefore, unenforceable in the
federal courts. 4
One could, of course, cite other countries' legislation and case law
prohibiting the formation of hostile military expeditions within their
jurisdiction. 5 It suffices to say that so general is this domestic position
that one can experience no difficulty in inferring a general principle of
law recognized by civilized nations which the Statute of the International
Court of Justice regards as a source of international law." This asser-
tion is bolstered by the fact that these domestic principles merely enforce
a duty which international law imposes on the States to respect within
their territory the rights of other States.s"
MEASURES OF PREVENTION
Much of the uncertainty touching the application of the preceding
rules arises not only from the doubts and indeterminacies affecting their
interpretation, but also from the fact that international law nowhere
prescribes the test by which a duty of prevention must be enforced.
Accordingly, many writers as well as much of State practice proceed on
the assumption that each State can determine by its own national stand-
79. Code Penal, art. 84 (Fr. 1810). For text, see 1 De~k and Jessup 583.
80. See Article 5 of the Declaration of Neutrality in the American Civil War, June
10, 1861, and the Law of January 21, 1937, authorizing the Government to take the neces-
sary measures to prevent the departure of volunteers for Spain. For texts of these docu-
ments, see 1 Deik and Jessup 590, 603.
81. [1932] Ann. Dig. (Lauterpacht ed. 1938) 31 (No. 9).
82. Id. at 32.
83. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852).
84. Id. at 50. The Court at 49 also stated that the contract was not only void, but
the parties who advanced the money were liable to punishment in a criminal prosecution.
85. See, e.g., Article 10 of the Canadian Act Respecting Foreign Enlistment enacted on
April 10, 1937, 1 De6.k and Jessup 239.
86. Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 38, para. c.
87. See note 15 supra.
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ards the nature and extent of the measures of exertion.88 Though vari-
ous attempts have been made to determine exactly the obligations of a
neutral in this regard, perhaps the most comprehensive statement of the
obligation is contained in the celebrated "Three Rules" of the Anglo-
American Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871.89 These rules were
accepted by the parties as a legal guide in the arbitration of the Alabama
Claims,90 involving the international liability of Great Britain for her
alleged failure to prevent the building and equipping in its ports of
naval expeditions in the service of the Confederate States in the American
Civil War. The first and third rules bound a neutral Government: "First
to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping,
within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to
believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a power with
which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the de-
parture from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on
war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or
in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use"'" and "thirdly, to ex-
ercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, as to all persons
within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of ... [these] obligations
and duties."192 Though the United States and Great Britain agreed upon
the "Three Rules," they failed to agree upon their interpretation. The
crux of the difficulty lay in the true construction of the phrase "due
diligence." While Great Britain contended that due diligence "signifies
that measure of care which the government is under an obligation to
use for a given purpose,"93 the United States, on the other hand, sug-
gested that it must be a diligence "proportioned to the magnitude of the
subject, and to the dignity and strength of the power which is to exercise
it." Without in any way adopting either of these interpretations, the
tribunal decided that it must be a diligence exercised by neutrals "in
exact proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be
exposed, from a failure to fulfill the obligations of neutrality on their
part . . . .." The rule has therefore developed that the responsibility
of the State in cases of military or naval expeditions departing from
88. 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 75, at 530. Cf. 3 Hyde, International Law 2327
(2d ed. 1945).
89. Treaty With Great Britain, May 8, 1871, art. VI, 17 Stat. 863, T.S. No. 133. Text
of the treaty is also in 1 Malloy 700.
90. United States v. Great Britain (1871). For the record of this arbitration, see 7
Moore 1059-67 (1906).
91. Treaty With Great Britain, May 8, 1871, art. VI, rule 1, 17 Stat. 863, 864.
92. Treaty With Great Britain, May 8, 1871, art. VI, rule 3, 17 Stat. 863, 864.
93. Lawrence, Principles of International Law 633 (6th ed. 1915).
94. Id. at 634.
95. 7 Moore 1067.
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its territory is to be determined by the degree of "due diligence" that it
has shown in discharging its international obligations. 9 However, dis-
satisfaction with the standard established by the term "due diligence"
has led international conventions to adopt a different terminology believed
to yield more satisfactory results. Thus, Article VIII of the Hague Con-
vention Number XIII of 1907," 7 while reproducing the first of the "Three
Rules" in almost identical terms, replaces the phrase "to use due dili-
gence" with the admittedly less ambiguous "to employ the means at its
disposal." Similarly, the Pan American Convention on the Duties and
Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife signed at Habana on Feb-
ruary 20, 1928,98 binds the parties "to use all means at their disposal to
prevent the inhabitants of their territory, nationals or aliens, from par-
ticipating in, gathering elements, crossing the boundary or sailing from
their territory.for the purpose of starting or promoting civil strife." 9
Finally, the rules adopted by the Institute of International Law on
August 13, 1875,100 impose upon the neutral Government the obliga-
tion "to exercise vigilance to prevent its territory from becoming a center
of organization or point of departure for hostile expeditions against one
or both of the belligerents."''1 1
The foregoing exposition would seem to make it fairly clear that the
criterion of "due diligence" has been abandoned in favor of supposedly
more ascertainable standards. But, apart from these modifications, there
can be no doubt that the obligations contained in the "Three Rules" of
the Treaty of Washington were declaratory of existing international
law"0 2 and that whether one refers to "due diligence" or to "the means
at its disposal" as a standard of obligation, these terms are limitative
in nature and do not impose upon the State an absolute obligation of
prevention. 10 3 It may be argued accordingly that the responsibility of
96. Fenwick, International Law 301 (3d ed. 1948).
97. Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War,
Oct. 18, 1907, Second International Peace Conference, No. XIII, art. VIII. For text, see
3 Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences-Meetings of the Second, Third
and Fourth Commissions 497 (1921).
98. Convention With other American Republics, Feb. 20, 1928, 46 Stat. 2749, T.S. No.
814. For text, see The International Conferences of American States 1889-1928 at 435
(Scott ed. 1931).
99. Convention With other American Republics, Feb. 20, 1928, art. 1, para. 1, 46 Stat.
2749-50.
100. For text, see Resolutions of the Institute of International Law 12 (Scott ed. 1916).
101. Rules of Institute of Int'l Law, Aug. 13, 1875, art. 1.
102. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 391 (1954); Accioly, Manual de
Direito Internacional Pfiblico 416 (1948); Rousseau, Droit International Public 692 (1953).
For the opinion of international lawyers of the time, see 7 Moore 1067-71. Contra, 2 Oppen-
heim, op. cit. supra note 88, at 577.




the State will not be involved unless it is unequivocally established that
the State has neither exercised due diligence, nor employed all the means
at its disposal in preventing the organization of military expeditions.
This interpretation is most certainly desirable, for it reflects the unassail-
able assumption that a duty of prevention cannot be exercised at all
times. If one starts with the proposition that a State in discharging its
obligations must do so faithfully and in good faith,10 4 then it cannot
reasonably be doubted that whether the duty of prevention will be
effectively discharged depends wholly upon the physical possibility of
doing so.105 Or, to put the matter in different terms, whether a State is to
prevent the formation of a hostile expedition is inevitably limited by the
capacity of the State, which must be interpreted as being as far as pos-
sibilities will reasonably permit.'06
It is perhaps for this reason that the Institute of International Law
said that "the mere fact that a hostile act has been committed upon
neutral territory is not sufficient to make the neutral State responsible.
Before it can be admitted that it has violated its duty it must be
shown that there *as a hostile intention (dolus), or manifest negligence
(culpa) ."17 Similar sentiments had already been expressed by Secretary
of State Cass in a communication to the Central American governments
as follows: "A Government is responsible only for the faithful discharge
of its international duties, but not for the consequences of illegal enter-
prises of which it had no knowledge, or which the want of proof or
other circumstances render it unable to prevent."'-08 In a somewhat similar
vein, the Government of Chile refused to accept responsibility for the
104. Wiesse, Droit International Appliqu6 Aux Guerres Civiles 169 (1898). See also
Lawrence, op. cit. supra note 93, at 634.
105. Rougier, Les Guerres Civiles et le Droit Des Gens 425 (1903).
106. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals
221 (1953).
107. See the Resolution dealing with the International Duties of Neutral States; Rules
of Washington, Article 5. For text, see Resolutions of the Institute of International Law
12, 13 (Scott ed. 1916). It would seem, therefore, that the principle of no liability without
fault is accepted in international law. The International Court of Justice had occasion
to endorse this principle in the recent Corfu Channel case between Great Britain and
Albania involving the international responsibility of Albania for mines found within its
territorial waters. The court said in this regard: "It is clear that knowledge of the mine-
laying cannot be imputed to the Albanian Government by reason merely of the fact that a
minefield discovered in Albanian territorial waters caused the explosions of which the
British warships were the victims. . . . [it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of
the control exercised by a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily
knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it
necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from
other circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor shifts the burden of
proof." Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.CJ. Rep. 18.
108. November 26, 1860, 7 Moore 928.
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departure from its territory of an expedition directed against Bolivia in
1872 on the ground that it was not sufficiently informed of the existence
of the expedition.1"9 This domestic position was unequivocally endorsed
by an international arbitral tribunal in the St. Albans Claims,"0 where
the United States sought to hold the British Government responsible
for the attack in 1864 upon the town of St. Albans, Vermont, by a small
party of persons who, acting in the interests of the Confederate States,
prepared their expedition in Canadian territory. The arbitral tribunal
unanimously disallowed the claims on the ground that the expedition was
conducted with such secrecy that no care or diligence which one nation
might reasonably require of another would have been sufficient to dis-
cover it. It would seem, therefore, that the international responsibility
of a neutral government is engaged only if it is at fault, and fault is to be
determined according to the circumstances of each individual case."'
There is, however, one area where the duty of exertion on the part of
a neutral seems to be more exacting and stringent. This refers to aircraft
which, because of their potential for offensive action, undoubtedly con-
stitute a greater danger to the opposing belligerent than military or
naval expeditions departing from neutral territory. It is precisely for
this reason that the Hague Air Warfare Rules of 1923112 have laid down
more strict rules on the part of neutrals. Particularly, Article 46 binds
the neutral government to use the means at its disposal:
1. To prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of an aircraft in a condition
to make a hostile attack ... if there is reason to believe that such aircraft is destined
for use against a belligerent Power.
2. To prevent the departure of an aircraft the crew of which includes any
member of the combatant forces of a belligerent Power." 3
While there can be little doubt that the first duty incorporates the spirit
of the first of the "Three Rules" of the Treaty of Washington, the sec-
ond provision imposes upon the neutral an additional obligation which,
though considered by some as wholly unnecessary and superfluous," 4
reinforces the obligation to prevent the possibility of its territory being
converted into a military base for hostile expeditions against a belliger-
ent. Following closely this international standard in regard to aircraft,
109. Wiesse, op. cit. supra note 104, at 176; Rougier, op. cit. supra note 105, at 425 n.2.
110. For the record of this arbitration, see 4 Moore, Digest of International Arbitrations
4042-54 (1898).
111. Wiesse states that if the participants of an expedition move about publicly, the
duty of the State is to apprehend them immediately without waiting for their formal
denunciation. See Wiesse, op. cit. supra note 104, at 177.
112. Rules of Aerial Warfare, Feb. 10, 1923, The Hague. For text, see 32 Am. J. Int'l
L. Supp. 12 (1938).
113. Rules of Aerial Warfare, Feb. 10, 1923, art. 46, 32 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 38 (1938).
114. See 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 75, at 578.
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the Danish-Rules of Neutrality of May 27, 1938,115 provide that "any
aircraft in a condition to commit an attack against a belligerent, or
which carries apparatus or material the mounting or utilization of which
would permit it to commit an attack, is forbidden to leave Danish territory
if there is reason to presume that it is destined to be employed against
a belligerent Power."" 6 It is submitted that this provision illustrates
well the manner in which neutral obligations ought to be observed.
THE. DEPARTURE OF SO-CALLED VOLUNTEERS
While the departure of volunteers from neutral territory has not tra-
ditionally engaged the responsibility of a neutral,117 their use in substan-
tial numbers as an instrument of governmental policy produces a situa-
tion which imperatively calls for the revision of the old law.-" The
customary rule in this connection is found in Article VI of the Hague
Convention Number V of 1907, which provides that "the responsibility
of a neutral Power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the
frontier separating to offer their services to one of the belligerents."" 19
The only prohibition imposed is the formation of combatant corps to
assist any of the belligerents as found in Article IV of the Convention. 20
As previously submitted, the cardinal distinction embodied in these two
articles reflected the nineteenth century laissez faire philosophy whereby
a line of demarcation could be drawn between the sphere of the govern-
ment and that of the individual, thus implicitly assuming that the purely
private actions of the individual could not be imputed to the State.' 21
However, the totalitarian character of wars and the almost complete State
control of the activities of the individual in times of war have made the
individual-State dichotomy for the law of neutrality factually nonexistent.
Therefore, it is the measure of the inadequacy of the nineteenth century
laissez faire philosophy that the assumptions on which Article VI of the
Hague Convention was founded no longer have any conceivable basis.
Consequently, in respect to volunteers, there is no adequate legal obliga-
tion under conventional international law.
115. For the text of this provision, see 1 Deik and Jessup 479. Actually, almost identical
rules were adopted by Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden pursuant to a declaration
signed on May 27, 1938, adopting uniform rules of neutrality. For text of this declaration,
see 2 Deik and Jessup 1518.
116. Rules of Neutrality, May 27, 1938, art. 15, para. 2 (Den.).
117. Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife 74 (1939).
118. Brownle, Volunteers and The Law of War and Neutrality, S Int'l & Comp. L.Q.
570 (1956).
119. Hague Convention No. V, art. VI, 2 Malloy 2298.
120. See note 48 supra. See also Raja Gabaglia, Guerra et Direito Internacional 321
(1949).
121. Stone, op. cit. supra note 102, at 384.
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Rejecting the fictions and assumptions upon which the older rules
rested, there are some conventions of a rather limited character which
modify somewhat the law in respect to both international war and civil
strife. Thus, as regards civil strife, the General Treaty of Peace and
Amity of the Central American States of 1923122 provides that "none of
the Contracting Parties will permit the persons under its jurisdiction to
organize armed expeditions or to take part in any hostilities which may
arise in a neighboring country.' 12 3 Similarly, the Pan American Con-
vention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife
adopted at Habana in 192814 binds the contracting States "to use all
means at their disposal to prevent the inhabitants of their territory,
nationals or aliens, from participating in, gathering elements, crossing
the boundary or sailing from their territory for the purpose of starting
or promoting civil strife.' 1 25 In respect to foreign war, the Habana Con-
vention on Maritime Neutrality of 1928,126 while providing that "neutral
states shall not oppose the voluntary departure of nationals of belligerent
states even though they leave simultaneously in great numbers,"' 27
further states, "but they may oppose the voluntary departure of their
own nationals going to enlist in the armed forces."' 2' Finally, in the
General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics approved
at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers held at Panama on October 3,
1939,129 it was provided that the American Republics
shall prevent on their respective territories the enlistment of persons to serve in
the military, naval, or air forces of the belligerents; the retaining or inducing of
persons to go beyond their respective shores for the purpose of taking part in
belligerent operations; the setting on foot of any military, naval or aerial expedition
in the interests of the belligerents .... 130
122. For text, see Conference on Central American Affairs, Washington, December 4,
1922-February 7, 1923 at 287 (1923).
123. General Treaty of Peace and Amity of Central American States, Feb. 7, 1923, art. 14.
(Emphasis added.)
124. See note 98 supra. See also Podesti Costa, La Revisi6n de la Convenci6n Inter-
americana sobre Derechos y Deberes de los Estados en caso de Luchas Civiles, Inter-Amer.
Jur. Y.B. 1949 at 9 (1950).
125. Convention with other American Republics, Feb. 20, 1928, art. 1, para. 1, 46 Stat.
2749-50.
126. Pan American Maritime Neutrality Convention, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989, T.S.
No. 845. For text, see International Conferences of American States 1889-1928 at 428
(Scott ed. 1931).
127. Pan American Maritime Neutrality Convention, Feb. 20, 1928, art. 23, 47 Stat.
1989-94.
128. Ibid.
129. For text, see 34 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 9 (1940).
130. General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics, Oct. 3, 1939, para.
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In addition to the above provisions, the legislation of a number of
States similarly forbids the departure of volunteers from their jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the United States Criminal Code provides as follows:
Whoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains
another to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the jurisdiction of the United
States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince,
state, colony, district, or people as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board
any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be fined not more than $1,000
or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.131
In like vein, the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870132 prohibits
the enlistment of British subjects in the foreign armed forces of belliger-
ents without the permission of the Crown. 3 3 Also the French Law of
January 21, 1937,134 authorized the government to take the necessary
measures to prevent the departure of volunteers to participate in the
Spanish Civil War. More particularly, the law prohibited "the enlist-
ment or other acts tending to enlist persons in the forces which presently
fight in Spain or in Spanish possessions, including the sphere of influence
of Spain in Morocco.135 Similarly, the decree of El Salvador regarding
the neutrality of the country in foreign or civil war enacted on October
9, 1912,336 prohibits the recruiting of volunteers and the organization
of military expeditions. 37 Finally, the East German Law on the Defense
of Peace enacted on December 16, 1950, 3 s provides that: "whoever...
recruits, induces, or incites Germans to take part in warlike actions
which serve to subjugate another people, shall be punished by imprison-
ment or, in grave cases, by imprisonment at hard labor."-m
It follows from the preceding exposition that even if no universally
binding convention imposes upon the States the duty to prevent the de-
parture of volunteers from their territory, the domestic legislation of the
State may explicitly prohibit it. These provisions, concurrent with the
conventions previously quoted, show that there is a firm conviction among
131. Foreign Relations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1952). It would seem that the "Flying
Tigers," organized and recruited by Colonel Chennault in the United States for the war
of China against Japan, was a violation of this provision as well as of the neutrality of the
United States.
132. 33 & 34 Vict., c. 90.
133. 33 & 34 Vict., c. 90, §§ 4-7. In 1940, following a League of Nations Resolution,
permission was granted to British subjects to enlist in the Finnish Forces fighting the
Soviet Union. See Brownlie, supra note 117, at 579.
134. For text, see 1 DeAk and Jessup 603.
135. Law of January 21, 1937, art. 1, § 1, para. (a) (Fr.).
136. For text, see 1 Deik and Jessup 566.
137. Act of Oct. 9, 1912, art. 3 (El Sal.).
138. Law on Defense of Peace, Dec. 16, 1950, [1950] Gesetzblatt des Deutschen Demo-
kratischen Republik 141 (Ger. Dem. Rep.). For text, see 46 Am. 3. Int'l L. Supp. 99 (1952).
139. Law on Defense of Peace, Dec. 16, 1950, § 2, para. 1 (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
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the States that the departure of volunteers should be made an inter-
national delinquency and that Article VI of the Hague Convention Num-
ber V falls short in this regard. It is indeed a matter of the gravest
doubts whether the large influx of volunteers such as that of the German,
Italian, and Soviet volunteers in the Spanish Civil War or of the Chinese
volunteers into the Korean conflict in 1950 could really proceed without
such organization as to avoid the application of Article IV of the Hague
Convention.140 One needs no greater effort to realize that any consider-
able amount of volunteers would almost certainly have to proceed through
an organization of some sort.141 To insist on calling them "volunteers" to
exempt them from the application of Article IV of the Hague Convention
amounts to concealing the reality of the situation, thereby permitting a
State to participate covertly in a conflict without in any way changing
its privileged status as a neutral. Continuous adherence to this outmoded
concept seriously impairs the possibility of effective regulation of the
subject. It is therefore submitted that no real progress is possible in this
area until such verbal illusions are abandoned. Once this is done, the
hard fact will have to be faced that the departure of volunteers violates
the independence of the State against whom they are directed,'42 thus
constituting an act of aggression. 43 Certainly, the Spanish Government,
in a note to the United States Secretary of State, characterized the influx
of German and Italian volunteers as "acts of invasion and aggression"
and desperately appealed to the principles embodied in Pan American
conventions and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.144 In respect to the
intervention of the Chinese Communist volunteers in the Korean conflict,
the General Assembly Resolution of February 1, 1951, found that "by
giving ... assistance to those who were already committing aggression in
Korea and by engaging in hostilities against the United Nations forces
140. Professor Stone persuasively argues this point. See Stone, op. cit. supra note 102,
at 389. Rougier said some time ago that though the formation of corps of volunteers is
surely due to private initiative and not State initiative, its importance is such that it is
impossible to keep it from the knowledge of the government and when this is the case,
it must be prevented. See Rougier, op. cit. supra note 105, at 418.
141. Stone, op. cit. supra note 102, at 389.
142. Thus, Article 4 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, prepared
by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, provides: "Every State has the
duty to refrain from fomenting civil strife in the territory of another State, and to prevent
the organization within its territory of activities calculated to foment such civil strife."
International Law Comm'n, Report, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 4th Sess., Supp. No. 10
(A/925) 1949. For text, see 44 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 16 (1950).
143. This would be an aggression which is not an armed attack. See The Question of
the Definition of Aggression, Memorandum submitted by Ricardo J. Alfaro to the Inter-
national Law Commission of the United Nations, A/CN.4/L.8, May 30, 1951.
144. Note From the Spanish Ambassador to the Secretary of State (1938), 1 Foreign
Rel. U.S. 180 (1955).
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there," the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of
China had itself engaged in aggression.
145
The Chinese intervention in Korea offers a contemporary illustration
of the totally inadequate range of Article VI of the Hague Convention.
Much debate surrounded the question regarding the legal position of the
Chinese Communist forces, but the body of opinion in the Political and
Security Committee of the General Assembly146 clearly indicated that in
any event Article VI was obsolete and that the Chinese intervention fell
more properly within the provision of the United Nations Charter which
prohibits its members from giving "assistance to any state against which
the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action."' 4 While
this argument is admittedly open to question since the Chinese Com-
munist regime is not represented in the United Nations, a more defensible
position would proceed on the theory that Article VI of the Hague Con-
vention is exclusively limited to volunteers crossing the frontiers indi-
vidually and singly, 48 and not to those crossing the frontier en masse,
for the presumption immediately arises that they form part of a fighting
organization or unit. 49 This presumption is aided by the fact that it is
scarcely possible for a substantial number of persons to cross the frontier
without some sort of organization." Moreover, the present day State
control over the movement of persons is so pervading and complete that
the departure of a vast number of individuals to participate in a foreign
or civil war must necessarily count upon the approval of the State, thus
engaging its international responsibility.' 5 ' The Chinese intervention
forces afford an instructive example of volunteers that ceased to be so
within the meaning of the Hague Convention because their disproportion-
ate number made it reasonable to assume the existence of a military or-
ganization. Though the arguments of the Soviet and iron curtain country
representatives put forth before the Political and Security Committee of
the General Assembly were well worn and emotionally charged,152 they
145. U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 1 (A/1775) (1951). It should
be noted, however, that this conclusion could be reached because the original movement of
North Korea into the Republic of Korea had already been characterized as an aggression.
146. See U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 5th Sess., 1st Comm. 401 (A/C.1/S.R. 409) (1950)
[hereinafter cited as Official Records].
147. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5. This argument was maintained by the Turkish
Delegate and supported by other representatives. See Official Records at 405.
148. Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences Con-
cerning The Law and Usages of War 280 (1909).
149. See the remarks of the Cuban representative, Official Records at 409-11.
150. The amount was estimated at 268,000 Chinese troops, Official Records at 410.
151. For development of this thesis, see Stone, op. cit. supra note 102, at 411.
152. For some of these views, see Official Records at 415-19. See also Kuski, Soviet




are nevertheless useful in showing the inadequacy of applying the 1907
Hague Convention, founded on nineteenth century conceptions, to wholly
different conditions. It is indeed of some significance to observe that
the Soviet Union representative might have been keenly aware of this
situation, for in the Convention Defining Aggression concluded between
the Soviet Union and her neighbors in London on July 3, 1933, "aid to
armed bands formed on the territory of a state and invading the territory
of another State" 'a was regarded as an act of aggression. It is only by
an extremely narrow interpretation that one can consider the Chinese
intervention forces as falling outside the scope of that definition.
It may be finally suggested that whether one considers the Chinese in-
tervention forces as volunteers or not, the inevitable fact remains that
in either case such forces were fighting against the forces of the world
society engaged in a lawful undertaking. It would seem that when this
is the case, the exemption provided for by Article VI of the Hague
Convention loses all its useful meaning, for, technically speaking, it could
not be applied to States hindering organized community action. That
this interpretation was adopted is clearly borne out by the Resolution of
the General Assembly of February 1, 1951, branding the Chinese Com-
munist Government an aggressor for its unlawful intervention.' This
resolution, moreover, stands as a living reminder that, though the matter
has been for the present settled, the future possibility of legally imputing
international responsibility to a State for allowing large numbers of
volunteers to depart from its territory is still to be determined by a
revision of the existing conventional law. Because of its urgency and
vitality, the formulation of this principle in a revised convention can
no longer be postponed.
CONCLUSION
The preceding pages have attempted to point up the inefficiencies of the
present law of hostile military expeditions. It has been made abundantly
clear that the domestic legislation of some States is far ahead of the
requirements of general international law. Thus, while most States
forbid the departure of volunteers, international law still refuses to
consider their participation in a war as an international delinquency.
Therefore, the revision of the law which is advocated clearly applies to
153. Convention Defining Aggression, London, July 3, 1933, art. II, para. S. For text,
see 27 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 193 (1933). The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind adopted by the International Law Commission of the United
Nations, Article II, No. 4, considers as one of such offenses, "the incursion into the territory
of a State from the territory of another State by armed bands acting for a political purpose."
International Law Comm'n, Report, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 6th Sess., Supp. No. 9 (A/1858)
(1951). For text, see 45 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 126, 128 (1951).
154. For text, see note 145 supra.
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the body of conventional international law which presently regulates the
subject. But the problem cannot be solved in terms of simple formulas
which endeavor to restore to the law of neutrality the nineteenth century
dichotomy of the individual and the State.'55 Rather, the solution of the
problem must be focused against the background of twentieth century
conditions. As such, it demands a frank recognition that in respect to
the law of neutrality the State must be made to answer for the private
actions of individuals. In so doing, the glaring paradox of allowing a
State to remain neutral while at the same time permitting its citizens to
participate individually in the conflict will to a great extent be eliminated.
It is hoped that this step will in turn remove the loophole which so far
has rendered the law rather ineffective. Perhaps it may not be an exag-
geration to say that the law of hostile military expeditions is destined
to occupy a pivotal position in the present reorganization of the world
society.
155. For a general plea in this connection, see Morgenthau, The Dilemmas of Freedom,
51 Am. Pol. Sd. Rev. 714 (1957).
